Quote:
Originally posted by mishak
nice point MikeZ
However Russia is not such a big deal comparing the big currency reserves holders (approximate figures in bil.$):
550 Japan
350 Eurosystem
320 China
180 Taiwan
130 South Korea
110 Hong Kong
I guess Japan China already have 30% of foreign currency asssets in Euro.
On the other side ECB do not have any Euro at all.
I wait when the oil will be priced in Euro globally
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Agreed Russia is not the largest holder but may be a trend setter. China is a considerable wildcard.
In addition most of the oil is priced in USD for now but this may also be changing. Iran approved pricing its exports in Euro's not sure if it is in effect yet. Venezuela is looking towards the same pricing instead of commodity payments. Iraq was going to do the same (assuming any sanctions were to be lifted no war to have taken place). Now under US/British control it may provide a stabilizing factor for USD at least for now.
US consumes about 50% of total world energy so pricing energy imports in anything besides USD may up placing additional downward pressure.
Markets are interrelated. Our domestic policy may effect our equity credit/debt markets but it may not be as effective on the Global Scale at least not as much as it used to.
The following article has some interesting points on domestic global markets equity credit debt currency implications. The commentators may have a bearish bias but most of the facts sited speak for themselves.
http://prudentbear.com/archive_comm_article.asp?category=Credit+Bubble+Bu lletin&content_idx=27650
few excerpts:
October 22 – Bloomberg: “China raised almost $1.5 billion in its first overseas bond sale in two years luring investors with the promise of the world’s fastest-growing major economy record foreign currency reserves. China sold $1 billion of 10-year dollar bonds at a yield of 53 basis points more than U.S. Treasuries of similar maturity lower than the earlier-planned 55…
Oct. 21 (Bloomberg) -- Yukos Russia’s biggest oil producer kept more cash this year in Russian rubles ruble-denominated securities rather than dollars as its home currency heads for its first-ever yearly gain against the dollar. ‘This year we have been keeping a larger portion of our investment portfolio in rubles than what we had in the past simply because of the appreciating ruble’ Bruce Misamore Yukos’s chief financial officer told reporters in Moscow. The Russian currency has gained 6.8 percent against the dollar this year…”
It has been fascinating to witness truly historic financial evolution over the past decade. I have often attempted to explain how the Fed GSEs Wall Street have evolved to the point of having mastered the art of liquefying the market-based U.S. Credit system – Liquidity on Dem in Gr Excess. The nexus of this unparalleled power lies in the capacity for virtually unlimited GSE liability creation – insatiable dem for (implicitly guaranteed) GSE debt that can be issued in gross excess with no impact on perceived creditworthiness or investor dem (the “moneyness” of GSE liabilities); the Fed’s capacity/audacity to peg short-term interest rates significantly below market rates; the explosion of aggressive leveraged speculation; of course the dollar’s role as international reserve currency. These provided a confluence of powerful s unlike anything experienced in monetary or financial history.
This monetary/liquidity mechanism gained deserved credibility rectifying the tumultuous market episodes of 1994 1998 1999 2001 2002 experiences. Over the past several months this “mastery” has been absolutely flaunted. Credit liquidity speculative excesses were taken to a whole new level. Interest rates began to shoot higher in July. Quickly the highly leveraged speculation-rife bond interest-rate derivative markets faltered in near dislocation. But July through September Fannie Freddie exped their mortgage portfolios by the then unprecedented $160 billion (compared to the 2nd quarter’s $13.3 billion increase). Problem “resolved.”
It is worth briefly rehashing the dynamics of GSE “liquefication.” Today the system is acutely vulnerable to rising interest rates. For one we face unprecedented leveraged speculation that would be d into problematic liquidation in the event of a significant sustained rise in interest rates. Second there is great systemic risk associated with asset Bubble dynamics (especially throughout mortgage finance) exceptionally weak debt structures after years of poor excessive lending (Minsky’s “Ponzi Finance”). Third there is this incredible interest-rate derivatives monster that exps with each new day of Credit speculative excess. The GSEs speculators other financial operators have purchased derivative protection against rising rates. Sellers of unfathomable quantities of “insurance” must “dynamically hedge” their exposure in the event of rising rates -- they are d to sell/short Treasuries agencies other debt instruments into a declining market to establish positions that would generate the required cash-flow to pay Fannie Freddie all the rest in the event of a sustained jump in rates.